The Olympic Games are gone, the cameras have switched off, but the construction sites leave an accounting trace that can be read line by line. Between 2022 and 2024, the Ville de Paris delivered 48 facilities — pools, gymnasiums, libraries, cultural centers, schools — directly tied to Olympic preparation in the multi-year investment plan (PPI). This figure includes neither Solidéo facilities (Olympic Aquatic Center, Athletes' Village in Saint-Denis) nor those of the State or the Region: it covers only the Ville de Paris stricto sensu scope.
This article is not trying to say whether the Games were a good idea. That is a political question. It is trying to say what this preparation did to the City's investment finances: how much, on what, at what price, and with what gaps between what was planned and what was delivered.
A measurable peak, a decline already underway
Over the 2017-2026 decade, the City's investment follows a bell curve. The 2020 trough (pandemic effect: project postponements, temporary tender freeze) is followed by a steady rise to the 2024 peak, then a decline that brings 2026 close to the pre-Games level.
The peak reaches €1,733M in 2024 (real investment excluding debt), or +15% in constant euros versus 2019 (€1,510M). This surplus represents, cumulatively over 2022-2024, nearly €490M of additional investment compared with a constant-trend scenario at the 2019 level. That is the volume to understand.
By 2025, the decline is clear: −9% in constant euros versus 2024. The 2026 PPI, voted at the end of 2025, programs a return to 2021-2022 levels by 2027.
What the word "facility" covers
The 48 deliveries tied to the Olympic cycle break down into four families:
| Family | Count | Cumulative amount |
|---|---|---|
| Renovated sports facilities | 27 | €312M |
| Cultural centers & libraries | 11 | €184M |
| School facilities (Oasis playgrounds) | 7 | €68M |
| Crèches, leisure centers, other | 3 | €21M |
| Total | 48 | €585M |
The majority (27 deliveries) concerns neighborhood sports facilities: local pools brought up to accessibility standards, gymnasiums equipped with new flooring, rebuilt locker rooms. This is the family that forms the core of the "Olympic legacy" claimed by the City. The second item, at €184M, concerns cultural deliveries prepared to operate during the Games — libraries reopened after renovation, performance halls timed for June 2024 so as not to overlap the event peak.
Six cost overruns above 30%
Of these 48 projects, six saw their final envelope exceed the notified envelope by more than 30%. This is an arbitrary threshold — the regional audit chamber typically uses it as an indicator of significant drift. In absolute terms, these six overruns represent €47M of additional spending out of the €585M committed.
The causes, as they appear in published amendments (amendments are mandatorily published above 5% of the initial contract for contracts > €90k):
| Cause | Projects affected | Cumulative additional cost |
|---|---|---|
| Asbestos discovered during works | 3 | €18M |
| Foundations / unstable subsoils | 2 | €12M |
| Regulatory changes during works | 2 | €8M |
| Material supplier delays | 2 | €6M |
| Program revision during study | 1 | €3M |
Several projects accumulate multiple causes; the sum of occurrences therefore exceeds 6.
The average drift rate of these 48 projects is +18% between notified amount and final amount. This rate is strictly comparable to that observed on Paris construction sites outside the Olympic cycle. The Games did not degrade cost control; they simply multiplied the number of projects to be conducted in parallel.
The "cost overrun" observed on these six projects fits a familiar pattern of dense urban construction — archaeological surprises, asbestos in pre-1997 buildings, thermal standards that evolve mid-execution, suppliers under strain. The specific effect of the Olympic cycle was to compress three years of construction into a single interval, which saturated supply chains (concrete, steel framing, geotechnical) and lengthened delivery times. The 2024 CRC report on Games preparation provides the most rigorous historical comparison framework available to date.
The cancellation
A single project was officially abandoned mid-cycle: a mixed sport-culture facility initially programmed on a site in the 19th, removed from the 2022 PPI after an unfavorable soil study (presence of an unrecorded former landfill, depollution depth incompatible with the schedule). The committed funds (€3.1M in studies) were not lost in accounting terms — they were reallocated to another project in the same budget family — but the delivery promised for 2023 did not happen.
It is a single case, but it is instructive: out of 48 projects conducted under schedule pressure, only one failed outright. This is a very low failure rate compared with the French construction average (where about 4% of major public projects are abandoned mid-execution, according to the Fédération nationale des travaux publics). The discipline imposed by the Olympic deadline probably helped to close compromised files quickly rather than letting them rot.
What is still ongoing
Not all "Games" files are closed. As of 31 December 2025, 17 months after the closing ceremony of the Games:
- 5 operations are still in actual delivery, with a 6 to 18-month delay versus the initial schedule. The dominant cause: completion of interior fittings (flooring, specific sports equipment) postponed so as not to disrupt use during the summer of 2024.
- 2 operations remain in litigation with a contractor — one over roofing defects, the other over a claim for unvalidated amendments. Provisions booked in 2024 and 2025: ~€4M.
- Several files await their DGD (general and final settlement), which usually arrives 12 to 24 months after physical delivery. Until the DGD is signed, the final cost is not fixed: downward or upward revaluations remain possible.
Time compression, the true specificity of the cycle
Comparing the Olympic cycle to an equivalent cycle from the 2014-2020 mandate, the average unit cost per facility is not significantly higher — about +6% in constant euros, which is within the margin of error for inter-cycle comparisons. What changes is the temporal density: 48 deliveries in 30 months, versus 33 deliveries over the equivalent 30 months 2017-2019. That is 45% more projects in the same interval.
This compression has two measurable consequences on the accounts:
- Saturation of in-house project management: the Direction du patrimoine et de l'architecture temporarily increased its staffing through external AMO (assistance to project ownership) (+12 FTE-equivalents via AMO contracts during the period, see our analysis "Who advises the City").
- A peak in negotiated contracts without prior publication: the emergency procedure was used 8 times on the 48 projects (versus 1 or 2 per equivalent cycle). This is legally compliant (article R. 2122-1 of the public-procurement code) but it is statistically a weak signal worth monitoring.
What the numbers do not say
This investigation stops strictly at what public documents allow us to say. It does not say:
- Whether each facility was useful — that is a political debate, not an accounting one.
- Whether the final price was "fair" — we do not have access to the contracts of each subcontractor or to the internal cost studies of contracting firms.
- Whether the cycle had a macro-economic effect for the City — induced employment, tourism spillovers, international image: those are other investigations, requiring other data.
It says one simple thing: the Olympic cycle inflated investment by 22%, delivered 48 facilities in three years, with a cost-overrun rate above 30% on one project in eight, a single cancellation, and a decline already underway. The accounting signature is that of an investment cycle conducted under a rigid deadline. The political evaluation of the overall merits of the Games is a separate question, which cannot be derived from these figures alone.
Sources: Multi-year investment program 2019-2026 (Ville de Paris) · M57 comptes administratifs 2017-2025 (opendata.paris.fr) · Consolidated DECP 2022-2025 (data.gouv.fr) · Conseil de Paris deliberations (official Mairie de Paris database) · CRC Île-de-France 2024 report on Games preparation. Constant euros base 2023, INSEE GFCF deflator for general government. Scope: Ville de Paris budget only (excluding Solidéo, Métropole du Grand Paris, Île-de-France Mobilités, State, Région Île-de-France).